Francisco, but either omit the key cases15 or fail to discuss the use of Hispanic law in the judicial opinions.16 Two compilations of pueblo land maps from Los Angeles and San Diego, respectively, are detailed but primarily descriptive.17 The neglect of the secondary literature to analyze Hispanic law use in the pueblo litigation has resulted in some scholars uncritically accepting the idea, set forth in judicial opinions, that the "public trust" doctrine had an Hispanic origin.18 This assumption begs the analytical question whether American judges were sincerely "struggling" with Hispanic legal concepts, as Christian Fritz has maintained,19 or whether they were merely manipulating it to serve specific policy goals. This essay will attempt to evaluate California state judges' utilization of Spanish and Mexican law in the key pueblo land cases. Previous studies of water and mineral law in southwestern state courts have demonstrated how judges deliberately distorted Hispanic law to facilitate natural resource monopolization.20 The published pueblo opinions and parties' arguments in manuscript case files (from the California State Archives) allow analysis of the degree to which judges dutifully respected Spanish and Mexican property law under the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,21 and of the extent to which they misinterpreted Hispanic law through ignorance or by design. The latter two possibilities would not be out of keeping with the general nineteenth-century propensity to "invent traditions" as a way of justifying policy through an appeal to continuity,22 and specifically with the romantic views of Hispanic California which many Anglo immigrants to the new state imbibed.23 Evaluation of arguments referring nization was the promotion of political stability,42 so the preservation of community use rights and dispute resolution by consensus were more important than individual private property interests.43 When the American political system was installed in 1846, land speculators and settlers pressured the new authorities to privatize the communal aspects of the Hispanic land system. The desire to commodify the land was not surprising in the context of the massive speculation and investment that had taken place elsewhere in the early nineteenth-century United States, often resulting in the concentration of land ownership in a few hands.44 California's territorial Secretary of State Henry W. Halleck observed this process repeating itself, with "the mania for land speculations" resulting in many "irregular proceedings" by local officials attempting to respond to the demand for lots.45 San Francisco attorney Henry Haight considered that many sales by the American alcaldes and ayuntamiento (now the Town Council) were "of dubious legality," particularly the public auction of lots, which was never "contemplated or authorized by the Mexican Laws."46
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The military governor of California, Stephen Watts Kearny, authorized the sale of certain San Francisco lots as early as March 10, 1847, and Alcalde Edwin Bryant ordered a public auction to be held the following June 29.47 Although it was clear that these "beach and water lots" (waterfront and tideland areas) had been reserved by the Mexican government for public purposes,48 opinion in favor of their sale was strong, with one editorial writer rationalizing that "Mexican policy in relation to seaport towns differing very widely from ours, it has been deemed advisable to sell...and appropriate the proceeds to municipal purposes."49 Several months later the Town Council moved another step away from Hispanic law when it abrogated all conditions in deeds and titles, making clear that no lot would be forfeited due to the owner's failure to improve it.50 The Council went even further by ratifying an alcalde's grants of more than one lot each to various individuals.51 Endorsing the removal of these conditions, the California Star maintained that "[a]lcaldes always had the power to remove the conditions or renew the deeds at pleasure,"52 despite ..has increased beyond credulity."57 The pressure on the town council was so great that it could barely set aside land for public uses such as a jail, cemetery, and town square.58 Several years later Monterey's mayor had to exhort the city council to try to sell lots to actual settlers, who would improve the property for the general benefit, rather than to speculators who were buying and selling continually at auction.59 These sales apparently did the city little good financially, for by 1859 a bankrupt Monterey was forced to sell its entire tract of pueblo lands to Delos Ashley and David Jacks, in order to settle its indebtedness to the former for obtaining the city's title confirmation before the U.S. Land Commission. Apparently not in a temper to restrain growth, the Council did not respond to these suggestions, which might have resulted in vastly greater provision for convenient public space.64 As a consequence, by the turn of the century "most of the magnificent patrimony that the city of Los Angeles inherited from the old Spanish pueblo was frittered away," in the words of one local historian.65 Only "refuse real estate" without water access was left to be allocated for parks.66
According to the City of San Diego's land title attorney in the 1920s, city officials had disposed of the pueblo property over the years "like a card give-away game."67 Indeed, during the 1850s the city had been embroiled in litigation with individuals claiming the city hall, courthouse, and public school under alcalde grants.68 Like so many other California municipalities, San Diego ultimately could show very little fiscal gain for the loss of its estate.69 While some more remote towns, such as San Juan Capistrano, preserved their urban cores of public land and stable residential dwellings somewhat longer than the larger cities, by the turn of the century these too had succumbed to the pressures of speculative investment and heavily capitalized agriculture.70
The American judges faced with resolving conflicting demands for land following the conquest did so within a context of knowledge that many of the municipal land sales were inconsistent with the Hispanic laws they were required to enforce under the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty's property-protection provision. In the first place, public officials, attorneys and jurists had access to a number of legal codes and treatises that had been in 
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75. BRYANT, supra note 71, at 436 (referring to the Mexican practice of administering the law "in accordance with natural right and justice"). Heydenfeldt, who participated in deciding several of the pueblo cases, was speculating in lots.83 Others were more circumspect; attorney Harvey S. Brown considered that "no American Alcalde had any right or power to make grants of [pueblo] lands and that the titles were absolutely worthless," so he "never invested a dollar in an American Alcalde title, though [he] could have bought for a nominal sum large parcels of land."84 This exception tends to prove the rule, for the California bar's lack of concern that Hispanic law was being flouted, and investment in the outcome of the pueblo land disputes, would shape the direction of the ensuing litigation.
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Against this background, the first cases involving land grants and sales within former Spanish and Mexican pueblos approached the state supreme court in the early 1850s. Although all of the major cities in California would obtain federal confirmations and patents for their pueblo lands by the 1880s, the parallel state litigation over the validity of municipal conveyances of those lands has continued through the present day.85 The question of whether a particular municipality was entitled to its land was far simpler than the complex issues raised by city conveyances to private individuals, often under debatable circumstances.
One invent the prior appropriation doctrine of water ownership, to jump into the breach.98 Writing for the majority, Heydenfeldt overruled Woodworth, holding that San Francisco had definitely been a pueblo, that it had title to the land within its boundaries, and crucially, that alcalde grants could be presumed to be within the ayuntamiento's authority.99 The seller of the lot therefore had title and had not breached his warranty.lOO Heydenfeldt sprinkled the Cohas opinion with a number of citations to Spanish and Mexican law, but they did not support his key conclusions. He asserted that according to certain "laws and decrees," Hispanic municipal authorities were allowed to alienate city land "for the good of the towns," but he never specified what "laws and decrees" he was referencing. 10 Heydenfeldt's most important ruling, that alcalde grants were presumed to be acting within ayuntamiento authority, was similarly undocumented.102 In fact, this point was directly contradicted by Halleck and Mason's public orders, stating that Hispanic precedent prohibited alcaldes from disposing of pueblo lands themselves. 103
Some critics of the Cohas decision claimed it was the product of corruption, because Heydenfeldt was speculating in San Francisco lots.104 Others, including the "best lawyers of the city," according to one report, simply considered it bad law, because they believed "that there never was a pueblo" at San Francisco with the power to grant land.l05 Supporters of the holding, like the Daily Alta California, hailed it for inaugurating an era of "certainty and permanency in the matter of land titles."106 Whatever the justices' goals at this point, Cohas signalled their willingness to use Hispanic law as "window dressing" without linking it to the specific results they wished to reach.107
The court took a further step in the 1857 case of Welch v. Sullivan,108 holding that not only had San Francisco been a Mexican pueblo whose land could be sold by alcaldes, but also that the municipal corporation could dispose of its property via execution sales.109 The case arose after the city was forced to sell thousands of acres of pueblo land to satisfy judgments owed various creditors, including one Peter Smith; hence the deeds resulting from the execution sales became known as Peter In Welch, a Peter Smith deed holder sued to eject the possessor of the lot in question. ll The possessor, represented by former state supreme court justice Nathaniel Bennett (author of the Woodworth opinion), argued from Mexican archival sources that pueblo authorities had only limited land-granting power, which certainly did not include the right to sell town lands at execution.112 Bennett also referenced Governor Figueroa's 1834 decree allowing pueblos to rent or lease propios (but impliedly not sell them).ll3 In response, the Smith deed holder merely argued the procedural regularity of the sale, and made no mention of Hispanic law.114
Chief Justice Hugh C. Murray, writing for the majority, ignored Bennett's evidence and simply upheld the execution sales, categorically holding that pueblos "had a right to dispose of certain lands within the pueblo limits, to defray municipal expenses."115 The court asserted that this power could be found in "the foregoing quotations from the Laws of the Indies,"116 but although the opinion lists several published Hispanic sources, there is no citation lending support to this claim. The majority further argued that Congress's 1851 California Land Act, set up to adjudicate Hispanic land rights, operated to give San Francisco a new tenure, which included execution sale rights regardless of the pueblo's prerogatives under Mexican law.117 However, the legislative history of the Land Act clearly indicates that it was not intended "to confer titles, but to ascertain who is in possession of titles,"118 so Murray was obviously reaching to justify an expanded municipal jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding its difficulties in finding appropriate precedents, the Welch majority explicitly stated its policy goal: allowing the execution sales would aid the "industrious and fortunate" Smith deed holders as opposed to "idle and improvident" squatters who lacked any legitimate property rights.ll9 Giving San Francisco free rein to alienate its land added to its general fund and "laid the substantial foundations of a great city, which is yet destined to rival the marts of the world."120 Welch placed Hispanic law in the service of a financially influential group of settlers and in support of the burgeoning West Coast market economy.
Perhaps sensing that it had overreached itself, the court retreated slightly in Hart v. Burnett (1860 This time, however, the court accepted neither party's position, ruling that although the city owned its lands under the pueblo title, it held them "in trust for the public use" so that they could not be sold at execution to satisfy debts.124 Lots not dedicated to common use could still be granted or sold.125 Justice Joseph G. Baldwin, in his majority opinion, recognized that many Smith deed holders were speculators who had invested "but a trifling proportion of the value of the property bought," and that it was bad public policy to reward them.126 In a strong dissent, Justice Warner W. Cope insisted on adhering to Cohas and Welch, arguing that all city sales, via execution or not, should be considered valid.127
The majority obviously wished to retreat somewhat from Cohas and Welch, but did not cite any direct Hispanic legal authority that execution sales had been prohibited. Baldwin referenced the 1834 Figueroa decree and Escriche's Diccionario,128 but neither source supported his position. The former authorized long-term leases given "at public auction,"129 and the latter merely described execution sale procedures rather than specified what types of property were subject to execution.130 The majority was thinking in overly rigid categories, for Spanish and Mexican pueblo property may have been neither public nor private in a common law sense; i.e., the long-term lease of propios was not a sale, but did prevent land from being used in common. In 1903 the now solvent city attempted to invalidate the 1859 sale, arguing from Hispanic archival documents (published as part of San Francisco's federal confirmation brief)147 that municipal commons were inalienable, and that under Hart they certainly could not be sold to satisfy debts.148 Jacks merely maintained that the sale had been procedurally regular.l49 But the justices considered that under Mexican rule, any "public trust" had been subject to the "control and disposition" of the Mexican government, so that the California legislature's act of 1866 ratifying the pueblo land sale cured any defects in the conveyance.150
The court failed to cite any Hispanic law or custom in support of its position, and of course there was no evidence in Hart that Spanish or Mexican governments had ever authorized a pueblo to alienate all of its pueblo lands. With Jacks, not only was Hispanic municipal land law completely ignored, but even Hart had been twisted to eviscerate its minimal limit on privatization.
Pueblo land sales continued to be upheld in cases involving cities throughout the state. Los Angeles' conveyance of a portion of a public street was contested in the Omitting any discussion of Hispanic law or Hart, the appellate justices considered that a municipal charter provision prohibiting leases longer than fifteen years was intended only to exclude leases not ratified by the voters, because past practice allowed the electorate to bypass such limitations by majority vote.157 In San Diego, the pueblo lands had been leased over the years for petroleum exploration, shale mining, golf club facilities, hotels and restaurants.158 The recreational uses of pueblo land desired by the DeYoung plaintiffs were low on the list of the city's and the court's priorities.
This assessment of the California pueblo land cases demonstrates that the state courts turned from an initially strict construction of municipal land alienation authority in Ladd and Woodworth to a very loose interpretation of that power in Cohas and Welch, limited only slightly via the "public trust" obligation in Hart. Opinions after Hart either interpreted that decision as narrowly as possible (White) or distorted it to justify an opposite result (Jacks). More modern pueblo cases such as Dunlop and DeYoung have treated Hart, and certainly Hispanic law, as if they did not exist.
The evidence and arguments from Spanish and Mexican law in the case files and published opinions show clearly that California judges intentionally disregarded the prior, more communal legal tradition, and created a new regime of absolute municipal power to alienate land. At first they employed Hispanic law to justify results, but gradually abandoned it even as "window dressing." This jurisprudential distortion and the consequent urban growth facilitated California's shift from a relatively self-sufficient, rural ranching economy to a network of towns serving as trading centers for agricultural products.l59 153 
